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INTRODUCTION 
For the GANIL safety revaluation and the new project 
of accelerator SPIRAL 2, it was decided to replace the 
existing access control system for radiological controlled 
areas. These areas are all cyclotron rooms and 
experimental areas. The existing system is centralized 
around VME cards. Updating is becoming very 
problematic. The new UGA (access control unit) will be 
composed of a pair of PLC to ensure the safety of each 
room. It will be supplemented by a system UGB 
(radiological control unit) that will assure the radiological 
monitoring of the area concerned. 
This package will forbid access to a room where the 
radiological conditions are not sure and, conversely, will 
forbid the beam if there is a possibility of presence of a 
person. The study of the system is finished and the record 
of safety in preparation. At GANIL, the ions are 
accelerated by cyclotrons (C01 or C02, CSS1, CSS2, 
CIME) and are transported through beamlines towards the 
rooms of experiments (D1-D6, G1-G4). A first named 
extension SPIRAL was brought into service in 2000. It 
makes it possible to produce and post-accelerate, via the 
cyclotron CIME, the radioactive ion beams obtained by 
fragmentation of stable ions resulting from CSS2 in a 
carbon target. The project SPIRAL2 will arrive soon and 
has the same need in safety. 
Each room must thus remain confined (without human 
presence) when potentially dangerous ionizing radiations 
are present. This protection was identified as an important 
function for safety and is provided by EIS (Important 
Equipment for Safety). The EIS of GANIL are referred 
and described in the RGE (General Rules of 
Exploitation). It was decided to replace the current 
systems of security management by four distinct but inter-
connected systems. 
DESCRIPTION 
TCR (Control board of Radiations) 
This system controls, visualizes and stores the 
radiological state of the INB areas via radiation detectors. 
This system already exists but must be renewed in order 
to fulfil the current requirements of safety and to upgrade 
its electronics and its interfaces. This project is in phase 
of realization. It generates thresholds on its measures. 
This project is studied at the GANIL. 
UGB (Unit of Management of the Radiation 
detectors) 
This system ensures the safety of people in the event of 
detection of ionizing radiations in the controlled zones. It 
is inter-connected with the TCR which informs about 
measurements and thresholds of the radiation detectors 
and with the UGA (defined below) which informs on the 
possibility of presence of people in the rooms. It acts on 
the possibilities of decreasing or of stopping the 
radiations in question. This project is studied at the 
GANIL. 
UGA (Unit of Management of the Access) 
This project is planned to prevent the possibility that 
people can be in the presence of ionizing radiations in the 
controlled areas. That involves two precepts:  
• no staff in a room if ionizing radiations exceeds a 
threshold considered as unacceptable for health; 
• stop all accelerated beams which can create an 
ionizing radiation exceeding the threshold of 25 
μSv/h in a room where remains someone.  
Thus, the access should be forbidden: 
• to prohibit the entry, the rooms to be supervised will 
have manual or automatic doors and “security 
vestibules” with “one by one” passage to count and 
deduct the number of people in a room;  
• to prevent the radiations in a room, this system will 
command 2 beam-stops by beamline at the origin of 
the radiation; a second barrier is made up by SAAF; 
• information on presence of ionizing radiations will 
come via the associated system UGB.  
This project is studied by industrial companies. 
SAAF (Automatic System to Stop the Beam) 
If a problem is detected by the UGB or the UGA, this 
system stops all the beams of the facility before 
acceleration. This project is studied by industrial 
companies. 
The poster deals with the UGA. This system manages 
the room status. If someone is in the room, the UGA 
should stop the beam(s). If a beam can create radiation in 
a room, the UGA locks the doors and forbids the access. 
To do that, the UGA can control: 
• all the doors, closing and locking, of a room; 
• the 2 doors of a “security vestibule”; 
• the pair of beam-stops on each way of beam which 
can create radiations in the room; 
• evacuation signals (sound and visual). 
It manages the different status of the room and the 
passage between them. 
It dialogues with the UGB, SAAF and the Access 
Control System (biometric system). 
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Figure 1: Interconnection between the systems. 
STATUS 
There are 3 statuses for the standard rooms: 
• “PROHIBITED ACCESS”: there is nobody in the 
room and the entries are prohibited. The doors are 
locked by the UGA. The “beam stops” can be put 
OUT. 
• “ACCESS CONTROLLED BY UGA”: the doors are 
locked by the UGA but the accesses are authorized 
via the “Entrance control” in order to count-deduct 
the people inside the room. Consequently, the “beam 
stops” are maintained IN. 
• “ACCESS REGULATED”: the access is authorized 
and not controlled by the UGA. Consequently, the 
“beam stops” are forced IN. In order to recall this 
status, these rooms remain radiological controlled 
areas; all the doors are basically closed but not 
locked. 
 
 
Figure 2: SIL Levels.  
Industrials Standard IEC 61508 
Given the size of the project, it was decided to sub-
contract the study and the system realization UGA and 
SAAF to industrial companies. 
To do that, a GANIL working group realized a 
"functional terms of reference" and the choice of safety 
Standard was naturally the IEC 61508 and the FMECA 
(Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis).  
IEC 61508 covers all safety-related systems that are 
electro technical by nature (i.e. electromechanical 
systems, solid-state electronic systems and computer-
based systems). For the UGA, the asked Safety Integrity 
Level is SIL3 (Fig. 2). 
 
Figure 3: Synoptic of status changes. 
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This Standard gives recommendations for the 
development of hardware and software: 
 
Figure 4: Development V-model.  
The redundancy of the hardware is needed to have the 
SIL3 level.  
Materials 
The UGA retained structure for each room is: 
• Two PLC (1 safety PLC and 1 standard PLC). 
• All sensors have three contacts: NO (Normally 
Open) and NL (Normally Locked) for the safety PLC 
and NO for the standard PLC. 
• Two beam-stops by beam line. 
The Access Control System (biometric system) and the 
supervision are not important for safety. They are 
centralized systems and they dialog with the PLC via a 
private network. 
CONCLUSION 
The test of the prototype will begin at the end of June. 
The ASN (French Nuclear Safety Agency) will approve 
the systems within a few months. The UGA, UGB and 
SAAF will be installed in 2011 for GANIL and later for 
SPIRAL 2.  
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